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Abstract
The many-to-one interference channel has received interest by virtue of embodying the essence
of an interference network while being more tractable than the general K-user interference channel.
In this paper, we introduce information theoretic secrecy to this model and consider the many-to-one
interference channel with confidential messages, in which each receiver, in particular, the one subject
to interference, is also one from which the interfering users’ messages need to be kept secret from.
We derive the achievable secrecy sum rate for this channel using nested lattice codes, as well as an
upper bound on the secrecy sum rate for all possible channel gain configurations. We identify several
nontrivial cases where the gap between the upper bound and the achieved secrecy sum rate is only a
function of the number of the users K , and is uniform over all possible channel gain configurations
in each case. In addition, we identify the secure degree of freedom for this channel and show it to be
equivalent to its degree of freedom, i.e., the secrecy in high SNR comes for free.
This work was presented in part at International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2009, July, 2009. This work is
supported in part by the National Science Foundation with Grants CCR-0237727, CCF-051483, CNS-0716325, and the DARPA
ITMANET Program with Grant W911NF-07-1-0028.
2I. INTRODUCTION
In a wireless environment, interference is ever-present. Traditionally, interference is viewed as
a harmful physical phenomenon that should be suppressed or avoided. On the other hand, when
confidentiality of transmitted information is a requirement, because interference also limits the
reception capability of a potential eavesdropper, it may end up being beneficial to the intended
receiver. Hence it is important to study how to manage and/or introduce interference intelligently
such that its benefit for secrecy can be harvested.
In this work, we study this problem in the framework of information theoretic secrecy.
Information theoretic secrecy was first proposed by Shannon in [1] and was later extended
to noisy channels by [2]–[4]. In this framework, the eavesdropper is assumed to be passive and
has unbounded computation power. Secrecy is measured with mutual information: A message
is said to be secure from eavesdropping if the mutual information between the message and the
knowledge of the eavesdropper per channel use is negligible. The focus of problems studied in
this framework is to find the fundamental transmission limits of a communication channel if the
message(s) must be kept secret from eavesdropper(s).
The channel model we study in this work falls into the class of (interference) channels with
confidential messages. In these channels, the receiver(s) can hear more than one transmitter and
hence can eavesdrop on messages transmitted by other users in addition to receiving the message
intended for it. Interference channel with two users and different eavesdropper settings have been
studied extensively up to date, e.g., [5]–[12]. However, the gap between the achievable rates and
the best known outer bound is still unbounded except for special cases. Reference [5] identifies
the secrecy capacity region of a switching interference channel with confidential messages defined
therein. Reference [7] derives the inner and outer bound of a one-sided interference channel with
confidential messages and shows the gap between these bounds to be within 1 bit. Reference [8]
studies two-user interference channel with an external eavesdropper and identifies the secrecy
capacity region within 0.5 bit for the very strong interference condition.
Interference channel with more than two users has also been studied. A symmetric static K-
user interference channel is studied in [13]. Reference [14] has studied the K-user interference
channel where all links were i.i.d. fading and sampled from a continuous distribution. Again the
results in both cases are limited to achievable rates and no outer bound is known in general.
3In this work, we study the K-user Gaussian many-to-one interference channel, where K ≥ 3.
This model without secrecy constraints has first been studied by [15] and recently by [16]. In
this channel model, only the Kth user is interfered by the other users, hence the name “many-to-
one”. A main motivation for studying this channel is to be able to comprehensively characterize
the role of interference in this simplified K-user setting. Reference [15] derives the inner and
outer bound for the channel model and shows that their gap is bounded by a constant which is
only a function of the user number K. When proving the inner bound, [15] uses layered coding
and, for each layer, uses the sphere shaped lattice code from [17]. Doing so aligns signals from
the first K − 1 users at the Kth receiver, and facilitates the decoding process at this receiver.
Reference [16] characterizes a set of channel gains for which the sum capacity can be achieved
by treating interference as noise at all receivers and using random codes at all transmitters.
In this work, we introduce secrecy constraints to this model in order to assess the signifi-
cance of interference on secrecy considering the simplest setting for which this investigation is
meaningful: The Kth user, which is interfered by the first K − 1 users, is also an eavesdropper
on the messages transmitted by the first K − 1 users. Hence care must be exercised to ensure
the secrecy of these messages. The main contribution of this work is a lower bound and an
upper bound for the secrecy sum rate of this model for all channel gain values and interference
regimes. For two cases, we show the gap between these two bounds is only a function of the
number of users K: (i) all channel gains between the first K− 1 users and the Kth receiver are
not greater than 1 (the direct link gain), or (ii) the first K−1 users have the same average power
constraint and the same channel gains for the links to the Kth receiver. For other cases, the
bounds match in terms of the secure degree of freedom, which is a high SNR characterization
of the secrecy sum rate, but the gap between the upper bound and the lower bound we derived
is in general a function of both K and the channel gains.
The technique to derive the upper bound on the sum rate entails dividing the many-to-one
channel into a point-to-point link from the Kth user to the Kth receiver, and a multiple access
wiretap channel with an orthogonal main channel composed of the first K − 1 users and their
receivers [7], and upper bounding the secrecy sum rate of the multiple access wiretap channel
part [8].
To derive the achievable rate, we utilize structured codes and layered coding [11], [15]. The
design of the layers follows [15], but for each layer, though notably, we use nested lattice codes
4from [18] instead of the sphere shaped lattice codes as in [15]. The merit of using nested lattice
codes for secrecy problems has recently been demonstrated in [11]; and the equivocation in this
case is computable utilizing the nested structure.
We must also note that combining layered coding and nested lattice codes has been used in
[11] and [13] to prove achievability results for the fully connected interference channel with
confidential messages. As shown in [11] and [13], in general, the power allocated to each
layer is limited in order for their interference to be “cancelable” at multiple receivers. This in
essence forces us to increase the number of layers to support larger average power constraints.
Unfortunately, increasing the number of layers leads to increased rate at which the information
leaks to the eavesdropper. Luckily, for the many-to-one channel, since the channel is only sparsely
connected, the number of layers is bounded. In fact, it is only a function of the number of users
K [15]. This means, if each layer leaks information at a certain rate, the total rate at which the
information leaked to the eavesdropper is just a function of K and does not grow unbounded
with the average power constraint. This fact allows us to identify the two cases described earlier
in the introduction where the gap between the lower and upper bound on the secrecy sum rate
is only a function of the number of users K.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we describe the channel
model. Section III states the main results, i.e., the upper bound and lower bound on the secrecy
sum rate. Section IV proves the lower bound. Section V proves the upper bound. Section VI
concludes the paper.
II. THE GAUSSIAN MANY-TO-ONE INTERFERENCE CHANNEL WITH CONFIDENTIAL
MESSAGES
A. Model
The channel model is shown in Figure 1. There are K users, denoted by node S1, S2, ..., SK .
User k transmits a message Wk to its receiver Dk. The network is sparsely connected in the
sense that only the Kth user is experiencing interference from the other K−1 users. There is no
interference among the first K − 1 users. Let Xi, Yi denote the transmitted and received signals
for user i. Let √ai denote the channel gain between user i and receiver K. Then the channel
can be described formally as:
Yk = Xk + Zk, , 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1 (1)
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Fig. 1. Many-to-one Gaussian interference channel with K users
YK =
K−1∑
i=1
√
aiXi + ZK (2)
where Zks are independent zero mean Gaussian random variables with unit variance.
Let n be the total number of channel uses. Since for W1, ...,WK−1, node DK is an eaves-
dropper, which receives signal Y nK , we have the following secrecy constraint:
lim
n→∞
1
n
H (W1, ...,WK−1|Y nK) = limn→∞
1
n
H (W1, ...,WK−1) (3)
Let Wˆk be the decoding result of Wk computed by node Dk. Then in order for Wk to be
transmitted reliably, we need:
lim
n→∞Pr(Wk 6= Wˆk) = 0 (4)
The average power constraint for node Sk is Pk. Let Xk,i denote the value of Xk during the
ith channel use. Then the power constraints can be expressed as:
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
X2k,i
]
≤ Pk (5)
Remark 1: We restrict Xi, Yi, i = 1, ..., K to be real in this work. In [15], Xi, Yi, i = 1, ..., K
are complex numbers. In general, real and complex interference channel with confidential mes-
sages can have very different achievable schemes; see [11] for example. However, for the
6many-to-one interference channel, whether the model is real or complex does not lead to any
difference in terms of the results presented in this work. In a complex model, since the network
is sparsely connected, all phases of the complex links can be canceled by pre-multiplication at
the transmitters and post-multiplication at the receiver. The channel then becomes a real many-
to-one interference channel. Therefore the same achievable scheme and converse derived in this
work is applicable to the complex channel model as well.
B. Metric
Define Rsk as the secrecy rate of the kth user:
Rsk = limn→∞
1
n
H(Wk), 1 ≤ k ≤ K (6)
The secrecy rate region is defined as all (Rs1, ....RsK) vectors such that the constraints (3), (4)
and (5) are fulfilled.
The secrecy sum rate RsΣ is simply
RsΣ =
K∑
k=1
Rsi (7)
The secure degree freedom of the secrecy sum rate is a high SNR characterization of RsΣ and
is defined as:
lim sup
Pi=P,i=1,...,K
P→∞
RsΣ
log2 (P ) /2
(8)
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we state the main results for the Gaussian many-to-one interference channel
with confidential messages.
1) Secrecy Sum Rate:
The lower bound and the upper bound on the secrecy sum rate are given in the next two
theorems:
Theorem 1: Define i¯ and i˜ as
i¯ = argmax
i
{aiPi, 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1} (9)
i˜ = argmin
i
{ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1} (10)
7The secrecy sum rate is lower bounded by:
K∑
k=1
max{0, 1
2
log2 (Pk)} −max{0,
1
2
log2
(
ai¯Pi¯
max{1, ai˜}
)
} − f(K) (11)
where
f(K) = (2K − 1)
(
K − 1
2
+
K + 1
2
log2 (K)
)
+
1
2
log2 (K) (12)
Theorem 2: The secrecy sum rate is upper bounded by
RsΣ ≤
K∑
i=1
C (Pi)− C
(∑K−1
i=1 aiPi
(K − 1)c
)
(13)
where C(x) = 1
2
log2(1 + x). c = max{1, ai, i = 1...K − 1}.
The derivation of the achievable rate in Theorem 1 is given in Section IV. The upper bound in
Theorem 2 is derived in Section V.
2) Secure Degree of Freedom:
From Theorem 2 and Theorem 1, we observe the secure degree of freedom for the secrecy
sum rate defined in (8) is equal to K−1 if there is at least one i such that ai 6= 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ K−1.
Note that for the many-to-one interference channel without secrecy constraints, the degree of
freedom for the sum rate is also K−1 [15], which was shown by giving the transmitted signals
of users 2, ..., K − 1 to user K as genie information. Hence imposing secrecy constraints does
not lead to any loss in terms of the degree of freedom for the sum rate.
3) Constant Gap Results:
Secure degree of freedom provides the characterization of the secrecy sum rate at high SNR.
For finite SNR, the gap between the lower bound from Theorem 1 and the upper bound from
Theorem 2 is, in general, a function of both user number K and the channel gains √ai. However,
in two cases shown below, we find this gap to be unaffected by the channel gains.
Corollary 1: When either of the following two conditions holds, the gap between the upper
bound and the lower bound on the secrecy sum rate given by Theorem 2 and Theorem 1 is
bounded by a constant which is only a function of K.
1) When all interference links are weaker than direct links: 0 ≤ ai < 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1, or
2) Symmetric SNR: ai = a, Pi = P , 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1
We provide the proof, which is immediate, next:
8Proof: When 0 ≤ ai < 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1, we have c = 1 in Theorem 2. Hence the upper
bound is
K∑
k=1
C (Pk)− 1
2
log2
(
K − 1 +
K−1∑
i=1
aiPi
)
+
1
2
log2(K − 1) (14)
On the other hand, the lower bound is lower bounded by
K∑
k=1
max{0, 1
2
log2 (Pk)} −
1
2
log2
(
K − 1 +
K−1∑
i=1
aiPi
)
− f(K) (15)
Since
1
2
log2 (1 + x)−max
{
0,
1
2
log2 x
}
(16)
=min
{
1
2
log2 (1 + x) ,
1
2
log2
(
1 + x
x
)}
≤ 1
2
(17)
we find the difference between (15) and (14) is bounded by
K
2
+ log2 (K − 1) + f (K) (18)
which is only a function of K.
When ai = a, Pi = P , 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1, the upper bound is
K∑
k=1
C (Pk)− 1
2
log2 (1 + min{1, a}P ) (19)
On the other hand, the lower bound is lower bounded by
K∑
k=1
max{0, 1
2
log2 (Pk)} −
1
2
log2 (1 + min{1, a}P )− f(K) (20)
we find the difference between (20) and (19) is bounded by
K
2
+ f (K) (21)
which is again only a function of K.
9IV. ACHIEVABLE SCHEME
A. Some Useful Results on Nested Lattice Codes
In this section, we state some results on decoding nested lattice codes from [11] for the
reader’s convenience. The proofs of these results can be found in [11].
We begin by introducing some notations. A nested lattice code is defined as an intersection
of an N-dimensional “fine” lattice Λ and the fundamental region of an N-dimensional “coarse”
lattice Λc, denoted by V(Λc). The modulus operation is defined as the quantization error of a
point x with respect to the coarse lattice Λc:
x mod Λc = x− arg min
u∈Λc
‖x− u‖2 (22)
where ‖x− y‖2 is the Euclidean distance between x and y in RN .
The signal XN transmitted over N channel uses from a nested lattice codebook is given by
XN = (uN + dN) mod Λc (23)
Here uN is the lattice point chosen from Λ ∩ V(Λc), and dN is called the dithering vector.
Conventionally, dN is defined as a continuous random vector which is uniformly distributed
over V(Λc) [18]. As shown in [11], a fixed dithering vector can be used instead. Either way,
the nature of dN will not affect the result described below. In the following, we assume uN
is independent from dN . We also assume that any dithering vector is perfectly known by all
receiving nodes, the point being that it cannot be used to enhance secrecy.
Due to the employment of a uniformly distributed dithering vector dN , the average power of
a nested lattice codebook Λ ∩ V(Λc) per channel use can be computed as:
P =
1
N vol(V (Λc))
∫
x∈V(Λc)
‖x‖22 dx (24)
where vol(V (Λc)) is the volume of the set V (Λc).
The rate R of a nested lattice code book Λ ∩ V(Λc) is given by
R =
1
N
log2 |V (Λc) ∩ Λ| (25)
where |S| is the cardinality of a set S.
We next describe a result on decoding nested lattice codes when interference is present.
Consider K +1 N-dimensional lattices Λp,i, i = 0, ..., K, such that Λp,i ⊂ RN , i = 0, ..., K is
Rogers-good for covering and Poltyrev-good for channel coding [19].
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Construct the fine lattice Λ as in [18, Section 7] such that Λp,0 ⊂ Λ. Hence {Λ,Λp,0} forms
a nested lattice pair.
Define independent random variables UN0 , UN1 , ...UNK , such that UNi , i = 0, ..., K is uniformly
distributed over the fundamental region of Λp,i.
Define σ2(Ui), i = 0, ..., K as the variance per dimension of UNi . When N increases, we scale
Λ and Λp,i, i = 0, ..., K such that σ2(Ui) remains unchanged.
Define ZN as a N-dimensional vector which is composed of zero mean i.i.d. Gaussian random
variables, each with variance σ2. ZN is independent from UNi , i = 1, ..., K.
Define tN as a lattice point in Λ∩V(Λp,0). tN is independent from ZN and UNi , i = 1, ..., K.
Define the notation ∑ i = 1jai = 0 if j < i.
Define Y N as
Y N =
(
tN +
K∑
i=1
UNi + Z
N
)
mod Λp,0 (26)
Define t˜N as the value for tN decoded from Y N using an Euclidean distance decoder:
t˜N = arg min
uN∈Λ∩V(Λp,0)
∥∥∥Y N − uN∥∥∥
2
(27)
Let R0 be the rate of the nested lattice code book Λ ∩ V(Λp,0).
With these notations, we have the following results:
Lemma 1: [11] Define
0∑
i=1
σ2 (Ui) = 0. If
R0 <
1
2
log2

 σ
2 (U0)
σ2 +
K∑
i=1
σ2 (Ui)

 (28)
then for each N dimension there exist lattices Λ,Λp,i, t = 0, ...K such that Pr(tN 6= t˜N) decreases
exponentially fast with N .
The following result is adapted from [18, (89)] and can be found in [11].
Lemma 2: Define µ as
µ =
σ2 (U0)
σ2 +
K∑
i=1
σ2 (Ui)
(29)
Then if µ > 1, the probability
Pr
(
K∑
i=1
UNi + Z
N mod Λp,0 6=
K∑
i=1
UNi + Z
N
)
(30)
11
decreases exponentially fast with respect to N .
To derive the secrecy rate, we need the following result from [11].
Theorem 3: [11] Let t1, t2, ..., tK be K numbers taken from the fundamental region of a given
lattice Λ. There exists a integer T , such that 1 ≤ T ≤ KN , and K∑
k=1
tk is uniquely determined
by {T, K∑
k=1
tk mod Λ}.
Theorem 3 was used in [11] to bound the rate of information leaked to the eavesdropper. In
this work, bounding this rate can be formulated as the following problem:
Consider a nested lattice pair (Λf ,Λc), Λc ⊂ Λf . Let XNk = (tNk + dNk ), k = 1, ..., K, where
tNk ∈ Λf ∩ V(Λc). tNk , dNk , k = 1, 2, ...K are independent. tNK is uniformly distributed over
Λf ∩ V(Λc). Then we need to find a upper bound on
I
(
tN1 , ..., t
N
K−1;
K∑
k=1
XNk , d
N
k , k = 1, ..., K
)
(31)
to measure the rate of information leaked to the eavesdropper. The reason for this will become
apparent in Section IV-B2.
Lemma 3:
I
(
tN1 , ..., t
N
K−1;
K∑
k=1
XNk , d
N
k , k = 1, ..., K
)
≤ N log2K (32)
Proof: We use the notation dN to denote dNk , k = 1, ..., K. From Theorem 3, (31) can be
written as:
I
(
tN1 , ..., t
N
K−1;
K∑
k=1
XNk mod Λc, d
N , T
)
(33)
where T is the integer in Theorem 3. 1 ≤ T ≤ KN .
I
(
tN1 , ..., t
N
K−1;
K∑
k=1
XNk , d
N
)
(34)
=I
(
tN1 , ..., t
N
K−1;
K∑
k=1
XNk mod Λc, d
N , T
)
(35)
=I
(
tN1 , ..., t
N
K−1;
K∑
k=1
(tNk + d
N) mod Λc, d
N , T
)
(36)
=I
(
tN1 , ..., t
N
K−1;
K∑
k=1
tNk mod Λc, d
N , T
)
(37)
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≤I
(
tN1 , ..., t
N
K−1;
K∑
k=1
tNk mod Λc, d
N
)
+H (T ) (38)
=I
(
tN1 , ..., t
N
K−1;
K∑
k=1
tNk mod Λc
)
+H (T ) (39)
We next use the fact that Λf ∩V(Λc) is a Abelian group with the operation x+y mod Λc. Using
it along with the fact that tNK is uniformly distributed over Λf ∩ V(Λc) and is independent from
tN1 , ..., t
N
K−1, we have
I
(
tN1 , ..., t
N
K−1;
K∑
k=1
tNk mod Λc
)
= 0 (40)
Hence (39) is upper bounded by H(T ) ≤ N log2K and we have proved the lemma.
B. Layered Coding Scheme
To prove the achievable rates we use a layered coding scheme [15]. This means the signal
transmitted by each node will be the sum of the signals assigned for each layer. Let XNk denote
the signals transmitted by the kth user at the mth layer over N channel uses. Let XNk,m denote
the term in XNk that comes from the mth layer. Let the total number of layers be M + 1. Then
layered coding leads to
XNk =
M∑
m=0
XNk,m (41)
XNk,m is just an all zero vector if no power is assigned to the mth layer by the kth user.
The signals received by the kth receiver 1 ≤ k < K over N channel uses is simply
Y Nk =
M∑
m=0
XNk,m + Z
N
k (42)
Hence the signal component received by each of the first K − 1 receivers is naturally expressed
as the sum of signals from at most M + 1 layers. If a codebook with a proper average power
and rate is chosen for each layer, the receiver can process the layers sequentially. This means,
when processing the mth layer, the receiver decodes XNk,m, subtracts it from Y Nk , and uses the
result as the input when processing the m− 1th layer.
For the Kth receiver, its received signal over N channel uses is given by
Y NK =
K−1∑
k=1
√
akX
N
k +X
N
K + Z
N
K (43)
13
=
K−1∑
k=1
(
√
ak
M∑
m=0
XNk,m) +
M∑
m=0
XNK,m + Z
N
K (44)
=
M∑
m=0
(XNK,m +
K−1∑
k=1
√
akX
N
k,m) + Z
N
K (45)
Again, if a codebook with a proper average power and rate is chosen for the each layer, the
receiver can subtract the influence of XNK,m+
∑K−1
k=1
√
akX
N
k,m after processing layer m and move
on to layer m− 1.
The maximal power that XNk,m can use is determined in the same way as [15]. As shown in
[15], we first determine the so-called delimiter of each layer based on the following procedure:
1) Compute the set Q˜1 as the union of the pairs {aiPi, ai}, i = 1, ..., K − 1.
2) Let Q˜2 be the subset of Q˜1 which only contains numbers that are greater than 1.
3) Let Q˜ be the union of Q˜2 and the pair {PK , 1}.
4) Compute the list Q such that the ith number in Q is the ith smallest number in the set Q˜,
i ≥ 0.
5) The number of layers M + 1 equals the cardinality of the list Q.
6) The delimiter of the 0th layer is defined as (−∞, 1]. The delimiter of the mth layer, m ≥ 1,
is given by [qm−1, qm], where qi is the ith number in the list Q.
Let Pk,m be the maximal power that the kth user can spend on the mth layer, i.e., E[X2k,m] ≤ Pk,m.
Then Pk,m is computed from the delimiters of the layers as follows [15]:
1) For the first K − 1 users, the power allocated to each layer is computed as follows: For
the ith user, 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1,
a) At most Pk,0 = max{1/ai − 1, 0} power is allocated to the 0th layer.
b) If aiPi ≥ qm+1 and qm ≥ ai, at most (qm+1 − qm)/ai is allocated to the mth layer.
Otherwise, no power is allocated to the mth layer.
2) The power allocation of the Kth user among different layers is determined as follows:
a) No power is allocated to the 0th layer.
b) If PK ≥ qm+1, at most qm+1− qm power is allocated to the mth layer. Otherwise, no
power is allocated to the mth layer.
Note that, with this power allocation among layers, it can be verified that the total power of the
ith user does not exceed Pi.
14
We next describe the codebook used at each layer: We use Ck,m to denote the codebook used
for the mth layer by the kth user. If the maximal power this user can allocate to the mth layer
is 0, then Ck,m only contains an all zero vector. Otherwise, we construct Ck,m as follows: We
start from a N-dimensional nested lattice codebook denoted by (Λf,m,Λc,m), Λc,m ⊂ Λf,m, with
average power 1 and rate Rm. Then, we scale every codeword in the codebook with
√
Pk,m so it
has average power Pk,m and let it be Ck,m. This means for a given layer m, Ck,m, k = 1, 2, ..., K
are scaled forms of the same nested lattice codebook (Λf,m,Λc,m). Hence, XNk,m is given by
XNk,m =
√
Pk,m(t
N
k,m + d
N
k,m) mod Λc,m, m > 0 (46)
where tNk,m ∈ Λf,m ∩ V(Λc,m). dNk,m is the dither vector.
To simplify the expressions, we set aK = 1. Let Um denote the set of users that can allocate
nonzero power to the mth layer. Then, for m > 0, we can write
XNK,m +
K−1∑
k=1
√
akX
N
k,m (47)
=
∑
k∈Um
√
akPk,m
(
tNk,m + d
N
k,m
)
mod Λc,m (48)
Notice that the power allocation among layers are chosen such that akPk,m equals qm+1 − qm.
Hence (48) equals:
√
qm+1 − qm
∑
k∈Um
(
tNk,m + d
N
k,m
)
mod Λc,m (49)
1) Decoding: We next describe the decoding process at each receiver [11]. First we describe
the decoding process at receiver K. The decoder starts from layer M and processes the layers
according to their index in decreasing order. It subtracts the influence of the signals from a layer
after it is decoded. Since user K does not transmit at the 0th layer, receiver K processes M
layers in all.
Define Y NK,m¯ as the partial sum in Y NK :
Y NK,m¯ =
m¯∑
m=0
(XNK,m +
K−1∑
k=1
√
akX
N
k,m) + Z
N
K (50)
When processing the m¯th layer, receiver K first computes:
(Y NK,m¯ −
√
qm¯+1 − qm¯
∑
k∈Um¯
dNk,m¯) mod
√
qm¯+1 − qm¯Λc,m¯
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Applying (49), we find (51) equals:
(
√
qm¯+1 − qm¯
∑
k∈Um¯
tNk,m¯ +
m¯−1∑
m=0
(
XNK,m +
K−1∑
k=1
√
akX
N
k,m
)
+ ZNK ) mod
√
qm¯+1 − qm¯Λc,m¯ (52)
Note (52) has the same form as (26), where √qm¯+1 − qm¯Λc,m¯ corresponds to Λp,0. √qm¯+1 − qm¯∑
k∈Um¯
tNk,m¯ mod
√
qm¯+1 − qm¯Λc,m¯ corresponds to tN in (26). Then, according to Lemma 1, if
0 ≤ Rm¯ < max{0, 1
2
log2(
qm¯+1 − qm¯
1 +
m¯−1∑
m=0
∑
k∈Um
akPk,m
)} (53)
then receiver K can decode (√qm¯+1 − qm¯ ∑
k∈Um¯
tNk,m¯) mod
√
qm¯+1 − qm¯Λc,m¯ from (52) with high
probability. We next derive a lower bound for the right hand side of (53) like [15]. From the
power allocation among layers, we observe
akPk,0 ≤ 1, 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1 (54)
and for m ≥ 1,
akPk,m ≤ qm+1 − qm (55)
|Um| ≤ K (56)
Applying these results to the right hand side of (53), we find it is lower bounded by:
max{0, 1
2
log2
qm¯+1 − qm¯
1 +
m¯−1∑
m=1
(K (qm+1 − qm)) + (K − 1)
} (57)
=max{0, 1
2
log2
qm¯+1 − qm¯
Kqm¯
} (58)
Hence a sufficient condition for receiver K to be able to decode (√qm¯+1 − qm¯ ∑
k∈Um¯
tNk,m¯) mod√
qm¯+1 − qm¯Λc,m¯ is to require
0 < Rm¯ < max{0, 1
2
log2
qm¯+1 − qm¯
Kqm¯
} (59)
After decoding (√qm¯+1 − qm¯ ∑
k∈Um¯
tNk,m¯) mod
√
qm¯+1 − qm¯Λc,m¯, receiver K subtracts it from
(52) and obtain
(
m¯−1∑
m=0
(
XNK,m +
K−1∑
k=1
√
akX
N
k,m
)
+ ZNK ) mod
√
qm¯+1 − qm¯Λc,m¯ (60)
From (59), we notice if Rm¯ > 0, we must have
qm¯+1 − qm¯ > Kqm¯ (61)
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Note that the right hand side of (61) is an upper bound on the average power per channel use
of the term inside the modulus operation in (60). Hence, we can apply Lemma 2 and find that
(60) equals
m¯−1∑
m=0
(
XNK,m +
K−1∑
k=1
√
akX
N
k,m
)
+ ZNK (62)
with high probability. Thus, receiver K can use (60) when it decodes layer m− 1.
We next describe the decoding procedure at receiver k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1. Receiver k processes
layers in a way similar to receiver K, except that it starts from layer m such that qm+1 = aiPi.
If ai ≥ 1, the index of the last layer it processes is the one whose qm = ai. Otherwise, it decodes
all the way to the 0th layer.
We define Y Nk,m¯ as the partial sum in Y Nk :
Y Nk,m¯ =
m¯∑
m=0
XNk,m + Z
N
k (63)
When processing the m¯th layer, receiver k first computes:
(Yk,m¯ − dNk,m¯) mod Λc,m¯ (64)
=(tNk,m¯ +
m¯−1∑
m=0
XNk,m + Z
N
k ) mod Λc,m¯ (65)
Again since (65) has the same form as (26), according to Lemma 1, if
0 < Rm¯ < max

0,
1
2
log2
Pk,m¯
m¯−1∑
m=0
Pk,m + 1

 (66)
then receiver k can decode tNk,m¯ with high probability.
If ak ≤ 1, Pk,m = (qm+1 − qm)/ak, m ≥ 1. Pk,0 = (1 − ak)/ak. Hence the right hand side of
(66) equals:
max

0,
1
2
log2
qm¯+1 − qm¯
ak
(
m¯−1∑
m=1
qm+1−qm
ak
+ 1−ak
ak
+ 1
)

 (67)
=max
{
0,
1
2
log2
qm¯+1 − qm¯
qm¯
}
(68)
If ak ≥ 1, there must exists m0 such that qm0 = ak. The right hand side of (66) equals:
max


0,
1
2
log2
qm¯+1 − qm¯
ak
(
m¯−1∑
m=m0
qm−qm−1
ak
+ 1
)


(69)
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=max
{
0,
1
2
log2
qm¯+1 − qm¯
qm¯
}
(70)
Hence, in either case, we arrive at the following sufficient condition for receiver k to decode
tNk,m:
0 ≤ Rm¯ < max{0, 1
2
log2
qm¯+1 − qm¯
qm¯
} (71)
We observe (71) is a less stringent condition than (59).
After decoding tNk,m¯, receiver k subtracts it from (65) and obtain
(
m¯−1∑
m=0
XNk,m + Z
N
k ) mod Λc,m¯ (72)
From (71), we notice if Rm¯ > 0, we must have
qm¯+1 − qm¯ > qm¯ (73)
Again the right hand side of (73) is an upper bound on the average power per channel use of the
term inside the modulus operation in (72). Hence we can apply Lemma 2 and find (72) equals
m¯−1∑
m=0
XNk,m + Z
N
k (74)
with high probability. Hence, receiver k can use (72) when it decodes layer m− 1.
With this, we have shown that the receiver k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1, can decode {tNk,m : Pk,m >
0, m = 0, 1, ...,M} and the receiver K can decode {(∑k∈Um tNk,m) mod Λc,m, m = 0, 1, ...,M}
if (59) holds.
2) Secrecy Rate Computation: We next derive the achievable secrecy rate region for each
layer, from which we will derive the achievable secrecy rate region for the whole channel.
Define U ′m as:
U ′m = Um ∩ {1, ..., K − 1} (75)
We model the mth layer as the following equivalent channel, which takes lattice points tNk,m as
inputs, and produces XNk,m as outputs to the kth receiver, 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1 and XNΣ,m as outputs
to the eavesdropper (the Kth receiver).
XNk,m =
(
tNk,m + d
N
k,m
)
mod Λc,m, k ∈ U ′m
XNΣ,m =


∑
k∈Um
√
akX
N
k,m, m ≥ 1∑
k∈Um
√
akX
N
k,m + Z
N
K m = 0
(76)
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To achieve a trade-off between the secrecy rates of the lattice points between the first K − 1
users and the Kth user, for a layer m such that K ∈ Um, two different modes of operation are
possible:
1) The first K − 1 users may choose to set tNk,m = 0, k ∈ Um ∩ {1, 2, ..., K − 1} so that for
layer m, receiver K decodes (∑k∈Um tNk,m) mod Λc,m = tNK,m.
2) The Kth user may send tNK,m by choosing it randomly from the nested lattice codebook.
In this case, tNK,m does not carry any information. Its purpose is to reduce the amount of
information leaked to the Kth receiver regarding the value of tNk,m, k ∈ U ′m.
For the first mode, the achieved secrecy rate region is given by:
Ri = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1 (77)
0 ≤ RK ≤ Rm (78)
For the second mode, RK = 0. We next find the achievable secrecy rate region for Ri, 1 ≤ i ≤
K − 1. Define Wk,m as the confidential message that is transmitted over the mth layer by the
kth user. Let the total number of channel uses be n×N . Define Rsk,m as:
Rsk,m = lim
n,N→∞
1
nN
H (Wk,m) (79)
For a set S, define WS,m and tS,m as:
WS,m = {Wk,m : k ∈ S} (80)
tNS,m =
{
tNk,m : k ∈ S
}
(81)
Then we have
Lemma 4: Let dNm be the shorthand for all dithering vectors used at layer m. The following
secrecy rate region is achievable for the channel in (76):
0 ≤ Rsk,m ≤ Rm −Rxk,m, k ∈ U ′m (82)∑
k∈U ′m
Rxk,m = lim
N→∞
1
N
I
(
tNU ′m,m;X
N
Σ,m, d
N
m
)
(83)
∑
k∈S
Rxk,m ≤ lim
N→∞
1
N
I
(
tNS,m;X
N
Σ,m, d
N
m|tNU ′m/S,m
)
, ∀S ⊂ U ′m (84)
0 ≤ Rxk,m (85)
Rsk,m = 0, k ∈ {1, ..., K} /U ′m (86)
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The mutual information is evaluated with tNk,m being independent and uniformly distributed over
the N-dimensional nested lattice codebook.
Proof: The codebook of user k, k ∈ U ′m, is a length-nN real sequence sampled in an i.i.d.
fashion uniformly from the nested lattice codebook Ck,m. Each codebook is randomly binned into
several bins, each containing 2nNRxk,m codewords. Each bin is labeled from 1 to 2nN(Rm−Rxk,m).
User k selects a codeword randomly from the bin indexed by Wk,m and transmits it over nN
channel uses. Receiver k can recover tNk,m. Hence, it can recover the length-nN codeword and
consequently, the bin index.
It remains to prove the secrecy constraint:
lim
N→∞
1
N
I
(
WU ′m,m;X
N
Σ,m, d
N
m
)
= 0 (87)
holds. This can be shown as follows:
H
(
WU ′m,m|XNnΣ,m, dNnm
)
(88)
=H
(
WU ′m,m|XNnΣ,m, dNnm
)
−H
(
WU ′m,m|XNnΣ,m, dNnm , tNnU ′m,m
)
(89)
=I
(
WU ′m,m; t
Nn
U ′m,m|XNnΣ,m, dNnm
)
(90)
=H
(
tNnU ′m,m|XNnΣ,m, dNnm
)
−H
(
tNnU ′m,m|WU ′m,m, XNnΣ,m, dNnm
)
(91)
≥H
(
tNnU ′m,m|XNnΣ,m, dNnm
)
− nε (92)
=H
(
tNnU ′m,m
)
− I
(
tNnU ′m,m;X
Nn
Σ,m, d
Nn
m
)
− nε (93)
=nNRk,m − I
(
tNnU ′m,m;X
Nn
Σ,m, d
Nn
m
)
− nε (94)
≥nNRk,m − nI
(
tNU ′m,m;X
N
Σ,m
)
− nε (95)
Equation (90) follows because WU ′m,m is determined once XNnΣ,m, dNnm is given. Equation (92)
holds because given WU ′m,m, the uncertainty in tNnU ′m,m can be resolved by receiver K as its rates
are within the capacity region of the multiple access channel with inputs tNnU ′m,m and output
XNnΣ,m, d
Nn
m . This is a consequence of (83) and (84). (95) follows because each N channel uses
are memoryless from the other N channel uses.
Dividing both sides by Nn and letting N, n tend to ∞, we have (87). Hence we have proved
the lemma.
Remark 2: The secrecy sum rate of the region given by Lemma 4 is always lower bounded
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by
|U ′m|Rm − lim
N→∞
1
N
I
(
tNU ′m,m;X
N
Σ,m, d
N
m
)
(96)
regardless of whether the region is empty or not. To show this, we can let Rxk,m equal 1/|U ′m|
times the right hand side of (83). Because the region defined by (83) and (84) is symmetric over
Rxk,m, the above choice of Rxk,m always fulfills (83) and (84). If Rxk,m > Rm , then (96) is clearly
a lower bound to the sum rate since it is negative. If Rxk,m < Rm, then from (82) we observe
(96) is a lower bound to the sum rate.
Define Rm, a region of Rsk,m, as a convex hull of the region given by (82)-(86) and the region
given by (77)-(78) if m ≥ 1. R0 is just the region given by (82)-(86) since user K does not
transmit at layer 0. Then if nN is the total number of channel uses, we have:
lim
nN→∞
1
nN
I
(
WU ′m,m;X
Nn
Σ,m, d
Nn
m
)
= 0 (97)
Lemma 5: The achievable secrecy rate region for the whole channel is given by
M∑
m=0
Rm (98)
Proof: In each layer m ≥ 1, we either let user K transmit or let the first K − 1 users
perform the random binning scheme given in Lemma 4 and let the Kth user send a randomly
selected lattice code to protect the signals of the first K − 1 users from leaking to receiver K.
Using the sequential decoding and subtraction scheme described in Section IV-B1, the first K−1
receivers can recover the lattice points from their respective transmitter for each layer. The Kth
receiver can recover the lattice point transmitted by the Kth user if the first K − 1 users are
not transmitting at this layer. From the sequences of recovered lattice points, each receiver can
recover the index of the bin which contains these sequences and hence can recover the messages.
Thus, clearly, the region (98) fulfills the requirement that messages must be transmitted reliably.
It remains to show that the messages of the first K − 1 users are confidential from the Kth
receiver. Let dNn be the shorthand of dithering vectors used at all layers. Then we can write:
I
({
WU ′m,m : m = 0...M
}
; Y NK
)
(99)
=I
({
WU ′m,m : m = 0...M
}
;
M∑
m=0
XNnΣ,m, d
Nn
)
(100)
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≤I
({
WU ′m,m : m = 0...M
}
;
{
XNnΣ,m, d
Nn : m = 0...M
})
(101)
≤
M∑
m=0
I
(
WUm,m;X
Nn
Σ,m, d
Nn
)
(102)
Since lim
nN→∞
1
nN
I
(
WU ′m,m;X
Nn
Σ,m, d
Nn
)
= 0, we have
lim
nN→∞
1
nN
I
({
WU ′m,m : m = 0...M
}
; Y NK
)
= 0 (103)
Hence we have proved the lemma.
Evaluating the region (98) is difficult due to the difficulty in deriving a lower bound to the
right hand side of (84). However, a lower bound on the secrecy sum rate can still be found,
which we describe below:
From the discussion in Remark 2, we notice a lower bound on the secrecy sum rate can be
obtained by finding an upper bound on the right hand side of (83).
For m ≥ 1, I
(
tNU ′m,m;X
N
Σ,m, d
N
m
)
can be upper bounded as follows:
I(tNU ′m,m;X
N
Σ,m, d
N
m) (104)
=I(tNU ′m,m;X
N
K,m +
K−1∑
k∈U ′m
√
akX
N
k,m, d
N
m) (105)
=I(tNU ′m,m;
√
qm+1 − qm
∑
k∈Um
(tNk,m + d
N
k,m) mod
√
qm+1 − qmΛc,m, dNm) (106)
=I(tNU ′m,m;
∑
k∈Um
(tNk,m + d
N
k,m) mod Λc,m, d
N
m) (107)
From Lemma 3, we find (107) is upper bounded by N log2 |Um|.
Hence
lim
N→∞
1
N
I
(
tNU ′m,m;X
N
Σ,m, d
N
m
)
≤ log2 |Um| (108)
Let the secrecy sum rate provided by each layer m be denoted by RsΣ,m. Hence we RsΣ,m,
m ≥ 1, is lower bounded by:
RsΣ,m ≥|U ′m|Rm − log2K (109)
=
|U ′m|
2
max
{
0, log2
qm+1 − qm
Kqm
}
− log2K (110)
For the 0th layer, since the signals are not aligned on a lattice, the method we use to lower
bound the sum rate is different. Recall that dNn0 denotes the dithering vectors used by those users
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transmitting at the 0th layer, which are known by all receivers. We first upper bound the right
hand side of (83) as shown below:
I
(
tNU ′
0
,0;X
Nn
Σ,0 , d
Nn
0
)
=I
(
tNU ′
0
,0;X
Nn
Σ,0 |dNn0
)
(111)
≤I
(
tNU ′
0
,0, d
Nn
0 ;X
Nn
Σ,0
)
(112)
=I

tNU ′
0
,0, d
Nn
0 ;
∑
k∈U0
√
akX
N
k,0 + Z
N
k

 (113)
≤I

XNU ′
0
,0;
∑
k∈U ′
0
√
akX
N
k,0 + Z
N
k

 (114)
≤NC

∑
k∈U ′
0
E
[
akX
2
k,0
] (115)
≤NC (|U ′0|) (116)
=
N
2
log2(K) (117)
where the notation C(x), as defined before, is 1
2
log2(1+x). Therefore, from Lemma 4, we have
RsΣ,m=0 ≥
∑
k∈U ′
0
Rk,0 − 1
2
log2 (K) (118)
Using (110) and (118), we are now ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1: From (110), RsΣ,m, m ≥ 1 is lower bounded by
RsΣ,m ≥
|U ′m|
2
max
{
0, log2
qm+1 − qm
Kqm
}
− log2K (119)
≥|U
′
m|
2
max
{
0, log2
qm+1 − qm
qm
}
− K − 1
2
log2K − log2K (120)
Since max{0, log2 x} ≥ max{0, log2(1 + x)− 1} [15], we find (120) is lower bounded by:
|U ′m|
2
max
{
0, log2
(
1 +
qm+1 − qm
qm
)
− 1
}
− K + 1
2
log2K (121)
≥|U
′
m|
2
max
{
0, log2
(
qm+1
qm
)}
− |U
′
m|
2
− K + 1
2
log2K (122)
≥|U
′
m|
2
max
{
0, log2
(
qm+1
qm
)}
− K − 1
2
− K + 1
2
log2K (123)
From (118), the secrecy sum rate provided by layer 0, RsΣ,0, is lower bounded by:
RsΣ,0 ≥
∑
k∈U ′
0
Rk,0 − 1
2
log2 (K) (124)
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≥ ∑
k∈U ′
0
1
2
log2
(
1
ak
)
− 1
2
log2 (K) (125)
Define fM (K) as
fM(K) = M
(
K − 1
2
+
K + 1
2
log2 (K)
)
+
1
2
log2 (K) (126)
Then we have
M∑
m=0
RsΣ,m ≥
M∑
m=1
|U ′m|
2
max{0, log2
(
qm+1
qm
)
}+ ∑
k∈U ′
0
1
2
log2
(
1
ak
)
− fM (K) (127)
Define Bk as the
Bk = {m : Pk,m > 0} (128)
Then (127) can be written as:
K∑
k=1

 ∑
m∈Bk
max{0, 1
2
log2
(
qm+1
qm
)
}+max
{
1
2
log2
(
1
ak
)
, 0
}− fM (K) (129)
≥
K∑
k=1
max{0, 1
2
log2 (Pk)} −
∑
m/∈BK
max{0, 1
2
log2
(
qm+1
qm
)
} − fM (K) (130)
Recall that i¯ and i˜ were defined in (9) and (10) respectively. With these notation, we can lower
bound (130) as:
K∑
k=1
max{0, 1
2
log2 (Pk)} −max{0,
1
2
log2
(
ai¯Pi¯
max{1, ai˜}
)
} − fM (K) (131)
As shown in [15], M ≤ 2K − 1. Hence
fM(K) ≤ (2K − 1)
(
K − 1
2
+
K + 1
2
log2 (K)
)
+
1
2
log2 (K) (132)
Applying it to (131), we get the theorem.
V. UPPER BOUND ON THE SECRECY SUM RATE
Let n be the total number of channel uses. Define V n as: V n = ∑K−1i=1 √aiXni +ZnK . We use
the shorthand Aa1,a2,...,ak to denote {Aa1 , ..., Aak}. Then we have the following lemma:
Lemma 6:
nRsΣ ≤I
(
W1,...,K−1; Y
n
1,...,K−1
)
− I (W1,...,K−1;V n) + I
(
XnK ; Y
n
K |Xn1,...,K−1
)
+ nε (133)
where ε is nonnegative and limn→∞ ε = 0.
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Remark 3: Lemma 6 is an extension of the technique from [7]. The technique expresses the
upper bound on the secrecy sum rate in two terms, as shown by (133). The second term in
(133) corresponds to the point-to-point link between the Kth user and its receiver. Interference
is removed since Xn1,...,K−1 appears on the condition term. The first term in (133), as we will see
later, can be bounded use the technique from [8], as it shares the same form as the secrecy sum
rate upper bound for a multiple access wiretap channel considered therein, whose main channel
are composed of the links between the first K − 1 users and whose eavesdropper receives V n,
which is the interference experienced by the Kth user.
Proof: The two user case (K = 2) has been shown in [7, Appendix]. The same technique
can be used here to prove Lemma 6. We first prove
nRsΣ − nε ≤I
(
W1,...,K−1; Y
n
1,...,K−1
)
− I (W1,...,K−1;V n)
+ I (W1,...,K−1;V
n|Y nK) + I (XnK ; Y nK) (134)
This can be done by starting from [7, (41)], with W1 being replaced by W1,...,K−1, Y1 being
replaced by Y1,...,K−1, X1 being replaced by X1,...,K−1, Y2 being replaced by YK . The V n1 therein
is replaced by V n. In this way, the secrecy sum rate is upper bounded as:
RsΣ − nε (135)
=H (W1,...,K)− nε (136)
≤I
(
W1,...,K−1; Y
n
1,...,K−1
)
− I (W1,...,K−1; Y nK) + I (WK ; Y nK) (137)
=I
(
W1,...,K−1; Y
n
1,...,K−1
)
− I (W1,...,K−1;V n)− I (W1,...,K−1; Y nK |V n) (138)
+I (W1,...,K−1;V
n|Y nK) + I (WK ; Y nK) (139)
≤I
(
W1,...,K−1; Y
n
1,...,K−1
)
− I (W1,...,K−1;V n) + I (W1,...,K−1;V n|Y nK) + I (WK ; Y nK) (140)
≤I
(
W1,...,K−1; Y
n
1,...,K−1
)
− I (W1,...,K−1;V n) + I (W1,...,K−1;V n|Y nK) + I (XnK ; Y nK) (141)
Hence we have proved (134). It can be shown that the following inequality holds
I (W1,...,K−1;V
n|Y nK) + I (XnK ; Y nK) ≤ I
(
XnK ; Y
n
K |Xn1,...,K−1
)
(142)
by using the following steps:
I (W1,...,K−1;V
n|Y nK) + I (XnK ; Y nK) (143)
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≤I
(
Xn1,...,K−1;V
n|Y nK
)
+ I (XnK ; Y
n
K) (144)
=I
(
XnK ; Y
n
K |Xn1,..,K−1
)
+ I
(
XnK ;X
n
1,...,K−1
)
− I
(
XnK ;X
n
1,...,K−1|Y nK
)
+ I
(
Xn1,...,K−1;V
n|Y nK
)
(145)
=I
(
XnK ; Y
n
K |Xn1,..,K−1
)
+ I
(
Xn1,...,K−1;V
n|Y nK
)
− I
(
XnK ;X
n
1,...,K−1|Y nK
)
(146)
=I
(
XnK ; Y
n
K |Xn1,..,K−1
)
+ I
(
Xn1,...,K−1;V
n|V n +XnK
)
− I
(
XnK ;X
n
1,...,K−1|V n +XnK
)
(147)
=I
(
XnK ; Y
n
K |Xn1,..,K−1
)
+ I
(
Xn1,...,K−1;X
n
K |V n +XnK
)
− I
(
XnK ;X
n
1,...,K−1|V n +XnK
)
(148)
=I
(
XnK ; Y
n
K |Xn1,..,K−1
)
(149)
which yields (142). Applying (142) to (134) yields (133) in the lemma.
Let V˜ n =
∑K−1
i=1
√
ai
c
Xni +
√
1
c
ZnK +
√
1− 1
c
Z˜nK , where c = max{1, ai, i = 1, ..., K − 1}. Z˜nK
is a length-n vector that has the same distribution as ZnK but is independent from ZnK . Then we
have the following lemma:
Lemma 7:
RsΣ ≤ limn→∞
1
n
(
K−1∑
i=1
I(Xni ; Y
n
i )− I(Xn1,...,K−1; V˜ n))
+ lim
n→∞
1
n
I(XnK ; Y
n
K |Xn1,...,K−1) (150)
Proof: Because V˜ n is a degraded version of V n, from Lemma 6 and data processing
inequality, we have
nRsΣ ≤I
(
W1,...,K−1; Y
n
1,...,K−1
)
− I
(
W1,...,K−1; V˜
n
)
+ I
(
XnK ; Y
n
K |Xn1,...,K−1
)
+ nε (151)
where ε ≥ 0 and limn→∞ ε = 0. Next, we extend the derivation in [8, (58),(65)-(68)] to the first
two terms, by replacing Y n with Y n1,...,K−1. The derivation in [8, (58),(65)-(68)] corresponds to the
case of K−1 = 2 here. In particular, if we define the notation ic = {j : 1 ≤ j ≤ K−1, j 6= i}.
then we can write
K−1∑
i=1
I(Xni ; Y
n
1,...,K−1|Xnic ,Wi)− I(Xn1,...,K−1; V˜ n|W1,...,K−1) ≥ 0 (152)
which corresponds to [8, (58)]. To prove (152), we start with the fact that ai
c
≤ 1, ∀i. Then,
using ai
c
≤ 1, ∀i, we have:
I
(
Xni ; Y
n
1,...,K−1|Xnic,Wi
)
≥ I
(
Xni ; V˜
n|Xnic ,Wi
)
(153)
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The right hand side of (153) can be lower bounded as:
I
(
Xni ; V˜
n|Xnic ,Wi
)
(154)
=I
(
Xni ; V˜
n|Xn1,..,i−1,W1,...,K−1, Xni+1,..K−1
)
(155)
=I
(
Xni ; V˜
n, Xni+1,..K−1|Xn1,..,i−1,W1,...,K−1
)
− I
(
Xni ;X
n
i+1,..K−1|Xn1,..,i−1,W1,...,K−1
)
(156)
=I
(
Xni ; V˜
n, Xni+1,..K−1|Xn1,..,i−1,W1,...,K−1
)
(157)
≥I
(
Xni ; V˜
n|Xn1,..,i−1,W1,...,K−1
)
(158)
(157) follows because each user does its encoding independently. The message of each user
is also independent from each other. Hence I
(
Xni ;X
n
i+1,..K−1|Xn1,..,i−1,W1,...,K−1
)
= 0. From
(153), (154)-(158), we have
I
(
Xni ; Y
n
1,...,K−1|Xnic ,Wi
)
≥ I
(
Xni ; V˜
n|Xn1,..,i−1,W1,...,K−1
)
(159)
Adding (159) for i = 1, ..., K − 1, we have (152).
We next use the fact that:
I(W1,...,K−1; Y
n
1,...,K−1)− I(W1,...,K−1; V˜ n)
≤
K−1∑
i=1
I(Wi; Y
n
1,...,K−1|Xnic)− I(W1,...,K−1; V˜ n) (160)
which corresponds to [8, (66)]. (160) can be proved as follows:
I
(
W1,...,K−1; Y
n
1,...,K−1
)
− I
(
W1,...,K−1; V˜
n
)
(161)
=
K−1∑
i=1
I
(
Wi; Y
n
1,...,K−1|W1,...,i−1
)
− I
(
W1,...,K−1; V˜
n
)
(162)
≤
K−1∑
i=1
I
(
Wi;X
n
ic , Y
n
1,...,K−1|W1,...,i−1
)
− I
(
W1,...,K−1; V˜
n
)
(163)
=
K−1∑
i=1
(
I (Wi;X
n
ic|W1,...,i−1) + I
(
Wi; Y
n
1,...,K−1|Xnic,W1,...,i−1
))
− I
(
W1,...,K−1; V˜
n
)
(164)
=
K−1∑
i=1
I
(
Wi; Y
n
1,...,K−1|Xnic
)
− I
(
W1,...,K−1; V˜
n
)
(165)
The lemma follows by adding the left hand side of (152) to the right hand side of (160) and
using the fact
I
(
Xni ; Y
n
1,...,K−1|Xnic
)
= I (Xni ; Y
n
i ) (166)
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We next prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2: The theorem follows by evaluating the bound in Lemma 7. This is
done by extending [8, Theorem 4]. [8, Theorem 4] corresponds to the case with K − 1 = 3.
We start with
K−1∑
i=1
I (Xni ; Y
n
i )− I
(
Xn1,...,K−1; V˜
n
)
(167)
=
K−1∑
i=1
h (Xni + Z
n
i )− h
(
K−1∑
i=1
√
viX
n
i + Z
n
K
)
−
K−1∑
i=1
h (Zni ) + h (Z
n
K) (168)
We next derive an upper bound on the first two terms in (168). The main technique is the
generalized entropy power inequality [8], [20]: Let Ani , i = 1, ..., m be m length-n continuous
random vector. Let S1, ..., Sp be p arbitrary subset of {1, ..., m}. Then
2
2
n
h
(
m∑
i=1
An
i
)
≥ 1
γ
(
p∑
k=1
2
2
n
h
( ∑
j∈Sk
An
j
)
) (169)
where γ is the maximal number of sets in S1, ..., Sp in which any Ani appears.
Without loss of generality, we assume v1 ≤ v2 ≤ ... ≤ vK−1 ≤ 1. Define vK = 1, v0 = 0.
Define Nnj , j = 1, ..., K as zero mean independent length-n Gaussian vector whose component
has unit variance. Then we have
2
2
n
h
(
K−1∑
i=1
√
viXni +Z
n
K
)
(170)
=2
2
n
h
(
K−1∑
i=1
√
viXni +
K∑
j=1
√
vj−vj−1Nnj
)
(171)
≥ 1
K − 1(
K−1∑
i=1
2
2
n
h
(
√
viXni +
i∑
j=1
√
vj−vj−1Nnj
)
+
K∑
i=2
2
2
n
h
(
K∑
j=i
√
vj−vj−1Nnj
)
) (172)
=
1
K − 1(
K−1∑
i=1
2
2
n
h(
√
viXni +
√
viZni ) +
K∑
i=2
2
2
n
h
(
K∑
j=i
√
vj−vj−1Nnj
)
) (173)
=
1
K − 1(
K−1∑
i=1
vi2
2
n
h(Xni +Zni ) +
K∑
i=2
2pie (1− vi−1)) (174)
The general power of entropy inequality was used to obtain (172). In (173), we replace
i∑
j=1
√
vj − vj−1Nnj (175)
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with √viZni , since these two terms have the same distribution.
Hence we have
K−1∑
i=1
h (Xni + Z
n
i )− h
(
K−1∑
i=1
√
viX
n
i + Z
n
K
)
(176)
≤
K−1∑
i=1
h (Xni + Z
n
i )−
n
2
log2
(
1
K − 1(
K−1∑
i=1
vi2
2
n
h(Xni +Zni ) +
K∑
i=2
2pie (1− vi−1))
)
(177)
For any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 1, (177) is a monotonically increasing function of h (Xni + Zni ).
Hence (177) is maximized when Xni is chosen to have a Gaussian distribution with independent
components. Each component is chosen to have the maximal possible variance Pi. Applying this
result back to (168), we find it to be upper bounded by:
K−1∑
i=1
C (Pi)− C
(∑K−1
i=1 viPi
K − 1
)
(178)
This, along with the fact that I
(
XnK ; Y
n
K |Xn1,...,K−1
)
≤ nC(PK), gives us the result in the theorem.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have considered the K-user (K ≥ 3) Gaussian many-to-one interference
channel with confidential messages. We derived the achievable secrecy sum rate as well as the
upper bound on the secrecy sum rate. The achievable rate was obtained using layered coding
and using nested lattice codes for each layer. The upper bound and the achievable secrecy sum
rate matches in terms of secure degree of freedom. Since it also matches the degree of freedom
of the sum rate when the secrecy constraints are removed, we observe the secrecy requirement
does not reduce degree of freedom in this model.
We have also identified two cases where the gap between the upper bound and lower bound
is only a function of K, and is independent of channel gains. One case is when the channel
gains of the interfering links are all ≤ 1 (direct link gains). The other case is when the power
constraints of the first K − 1 users at the Kth receiver are the same and the channel gains of
the interfering links are the same.
Nested lattice codes we used in this work has recently found many applications in solving
information theoretic secrecy problems, see [21] and [21] for examples where the equivocation
are bounded in terms of Shannon entropy and Re´nyi entropy respectively. In [21], we use nested
29
lattice codes to prove that Gaussian signaling is suboptimal at high SNR for a large class of
two-user Gaussian channel with secrecy constraints. This work can be viewed as a generalization
of [21] to the K-user case (K ≥ 3).
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